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Domestic violence generates long-term effects on offenders, victims, and other household members.
Insight into triggers of family violence can inform policy and improve services aimed at reducing abusive
behavior. We investigate potential domestic violence triggers by analyzing unexpected losses in National
Basketball Association games. The literature identifies increasing in-home violence after unexpected
losses in the National Football League. Combining information on referee accuracy and fatigue, we
develop a unique identification strategy to explore the impact of human error on family violence following
unexpected losses. Results indicate that as referees are more accurate (more rested) in unexpected losses,
family violence decreases, suggesting that the ability to place blame for a loss on referees increases the
likelihood of violent outbursts. Further investigation shows that these results concentrate in games where
referees are less rested and betting markets were less certain of the game outcome.
JEL Codes: J44, K42, Z22
Key Words: Domestic violence, job performance, emotional cues
1 Introduction
Family violence represents a pervasive problem in communities around the world. Reductions in health,
lost productivity, along with policing and adjudication costs account for just a few of the costs associated
with family violence. Peterson et al. (2018) estimated lifetime costs of family violence at $103,767 per female
victim and $23,414 per male victim, generating a national economic burden of nearly $3.6 trillion. Family
violence affects individual members differently. Most cases involve violence toward women, as about 1 in 4
women (25.1% or 30 million) in the United States experienced a form of family violence (sexual, physical,
and/or stalking) in their lifetime (2015 National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey). In families
with children, family violence can have serious effects on child development and behavior.
Research identifies negative effects of family violence on child emotional health (Greene et al., 2018), and
finds that these effects spill over onto their peers through emotional or disruptive behavior in school (Carrell
et al., 2018). The 2018 National Crime Victims’ Rights: Crime and Victimization Fact Sheet reported
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that “67% of violent victimizations were committed by a relative, 54% by an intimate partner, 43% by an
acquaintance (either well-known or casual), and 42% by strangers.”, further study of family violence and its
causes can mitigate or even prevent these traumatic, long-term effects for households.
Given the large costs and wide prevalence of family violence, our analysis focuses on two types of family
violence: coercive behavior and expressive aggression (Breiding et al., 2015). Family violence that affects
household roles and incentives represents an example of coercive behavior. Tur-Prats (2019) offers evidence
that households where other family members handle childcare, thus allowing the wife to work, experience
less intimate partner violence than households where a wife raises children at home.
The cost of violence is high for working wives, as it results in reduced household productivity. Women who
control resources for the household also face an increased risk of family violence. Hsu (2017) provide evidence
of this risk by analyzing the timing of welfare payments to female TANF recipients. Hsu finds increased
incidence of assault and intimidation before payment dates, suggesting men use the threat of violence to
gain control of household resources before payments get disbursed to women. If women can maintain control
of resources under the threat of violence, evidence shows that women recipients of cash, vouchers, and food
transfers experience reductions in intimate partner violence (Bobonis et al., 2013; Hidrobo et al., 2016).
Aggression represents another important form of family violence. Aggression can be triggered by emo-
tional stimuli, an example of expressive aggression. The unexpected nature of expressive aggression com-
plicates the identification of triggers for these events. Violent episodes can be provoked by victims directly
(Babcock et al., 2004) or through an offender’s alcohol or substance abuse (Klostermann and Fals-Stewart,
2006). Random events like the sudden death of friends or family (Marshall et al., 2011), unintended preg-
nancy (Martin and Garcia, 2011), or poor stock market returns (Huck, 2018) have been identified as triggers
for family violence. Following Card and Dahl (2011), we focus on violent aggression generated by the
uncertainty of outcome in sports competitions.
Some unexpected game outcomes reflect extenuating circumstances like fan interference in play, for
example Jeffrey Maier in Game 1 of the 1996 MLB American League Championship Series and Steve Bartman
in Game 6 of the 2003 MLB National League Championship Series, as well as other forms of human error.
Evidence suggests unexpected sports outcomes affect many fan decisions following games. For example,
Ge (2018) found evidence of increased tips to New York City taxi drivers after unexpected wins, Eren and
Mocan (2018) found evidence of increased judicial sentencing on the next workday after unexpected losses,
and Potoski and Urbatsch (2017) found evidence of decreased voter turnout on Tuesdays after “competitive”
Monday Night Football games. Violence and crime have also been shown to increase after unexpected game
outcomes. Sarmiento-Barbieri et al. (2018) found evidence of increased crime after unexpected losses in
home soccer matches in Brazil.
Card and Dahl (2011) represents the paper most closely related to ours. Card and Dahl (2011) found
evidence that unexpected outcomes in professional football games trigger family violence. Their results
showed that domestic violence increased in cities home to National Football League teams following games
the home team was expected to win but instead lost. Their results imply substantial costs for households
impacted by emotional outbursts following dashed expectations of home team wins. We could mitigate these
violent outbursts from further analysis of triggers of violence.
We contribute to the literature by confirming this also occurs following unexpected losses in a different
sport, the National Basketball Association (NBA), and investigating a potential mechanism through which
unexpected sports outcomes trigger family violence. Previous research did not investigate mechanisms. To
identify a sports-related trigger for family violence, we combine information on NBA referee accuracy and
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fatigue to explore the impact of human error on NBA game outcomes. Using measures of events that
contribute to referee fatigue like distance traveled between games refereed, travel-related changes in times
zones, and the number of days rest between games worked by specific NBA referees, we explore fatigue as an
explanation for increased incorrect calls in close NBA games. Our identification exploits detailed information
contained in the NBA Last Two Minute Report, a league-produced report which contains detailed, objective
post-game evaluations of the accuracy of referee calls at the end of close NBA games. Our results confirm
previous research reporting that fatigue negatively affects referee accuracy (Weston et al., 2006).
To investigate referee accuracy as a trigger for family violence, we adopt the empirical approach used by
Card and Dahl (2011) to analyzing crime data from eight counties home to NBA teams following unexpected
home team losses. The length of the NBA season provides a large enough sample of games to analyze the
impact of unexpected game outcomes on family violence. Results show in-home violence against women
increases after unexpected losses, and also increases in counties where the home team lost unexpectedly.
The scope of sports-related domestic violence appears larger than previously thought, as the NBA season
contains many more games than the NFL season.
We investigate the role played by referee fatigue on game outcomes and how this further triggers violence
against women, a previously unexplored area. If a referee makes enough incorrect calls during a close game,
blaming the loss on human error could trigger violent outbursts among male fans, as family aggressors often
project blame for negative events onto their victims. We find that as referees are more rested, and thus
make more correct calls, family violence decreases after unexpected NBA losses. We interpret this result
as reflecting human error as a mechanism for triggering family violence. As expressive violence needs a
stimulus, the ability to lay blame for an unexpected loss on referee mistakes triggers aggressive behavior.
2 Data and Setting
Card and Dahl (2011) found substantial increases in family violence in cities home to NFL teams after
unexpected home team losses and attributed this to negative emotional cues generated by these losses. Card
and Dahl (2011) treated upset losses as homogeneous outcomes. However, upset losses can differ in terms
of why they occur, and the explanation for why upset losses occur might affect the strength of any negative
emotional cue these losses generate, and the corresponding impact on domestic violence. Literature on the
psychology of family violence identifies loss of control and victim blaming as common justifications used by
offenders (Ali et al., 2016). If fans identify officiating as the cause of an unexpected loss, then they may be
more likely to project blame onto their spouse or partner, increasing the likelihood of a violent episode.
Investigating this requires an empirical setting where specific explanations for unexpected game outcomes
can be identified. Recent policy initiatives instituted by the NBA make it possible to quantify referee accuracy
at the end of close games, and thus determine the role played by referee mistakes in unexpected NBA team
losses. The NBA recently implemented a policy of evaluating referee decisions at the end of close games with
the intent of increasing transparency and the quality of officiating. The NBA evaluates referee performance
at the end of games where the score difference falls within a certain point margin and makes the results of
these evaluations public. Objective evaluation of referee performance in close games provides an opportunity
to quantify the effect of human error on game outcomes. We explore this effect as a channel for triggering
family violence.
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2.1 The Last Two Minute Report
In February 2015, the NBA announced a new transparency initiative in its officiating program called the
Last Two Minute Report (“L2M”)1. The NBA publishes an L2M report for all “close” games. The NBA
defines a close game as any game where the score difference is three points or fewer at any time in the last
two minutes of the fourth quarter. If a game qualifies for an L2M report, the NBA initiates an evaluation
of “all calls and material non-calls that occur in the last two minutes”, and then publicly releases these
evaluations as an L2M report2.
The L2M report contains a play-by-play description of when each referee call was made, the referee call,
which player committed the infraction, which player the offending player committed an infraction against
(if applicable), and the review decision for the referee call. The most interesting feature of the L2M, the
review decision clearly states whether or not a call or no-call was correct. Third party reviewers, trained in
the same way as NBA referees on how to evaluate play, determine the correctness of each referee call for an
L2M.
Once determined, these third party evaluations are approved by “ref ops senior staff (former officials)
and senior b-ball ops personnel, much to the chagrin of NBA referees”3. Since L2Ms evaluate both referee
calls and material non-calls, evaluations take one of four forms: correct call, correct no-call, incorrect call,
and incorrect no-call. We define and discuss both correct calls and correct no-calls as “correct calls”, even
though they are different types of correctness. Also, L2M reports contain a hyperlink to video replay of the
event in question, allowing anyone to watch the replay in order to understand how the reviewers reached
their decision.
Given that the NBA makes L2Ms public, we use this objective evaluation of referee decisions to identify
how correctly referees officiated a particular basketball game in the last two minutes of play. Given an
objective measure of human error during close games, we can further assess the impact, if any, on domestic
violence. Several factors prevent us from being able to use this measure of referee correctness in our analysis
of unexpected losses. Since the L2M is published only after close games, there will be bias in the sample of
games in which we measure human error as the sample will not contain games that were unexpected losses
but never met the point threshold criterion for the release of an L2M. Analyzing only close unexpected losses
potentially biases our results. To mitigate this problem, we use the L2M to measure referee correctness
conditional on referee fatigue. Exploiting the correlation between fatigue and correctness, we can explore
more deeply the impact of human error as a trigger for intimate partner violence. Also, the small number
of L2M reports produced to date limits the power of our analysis.
2.2 National Incident-Based Reporting System Crime Data
We measure family violence using data from the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS).
NIBRS data include individual reports of violence made to police agencies, but are not necessarily associated
with an arrest for reported incidents. Each NIBRS incident report contains information on both the victim
1Other components of this initiative included “the launch of the NBA Replay Center”, real-time postings on NBA.com, the
creation of the Twitter handle @NBAOfficial to disseminate the replays used by referee evaluators to make decisions during
replay reviews, and bi-weekly rule “points of emphasis” memos that are sent to teams, referees and the media. Official Press
Release, “NBA to share ’Last Two Minutes’ officiating reports beginning March 2” NBA.com, 27 February 2015.
2When the L2M was first implemented in the middle of the 2014-2015 season, a game would trigger an L2M report if the
score difference was within five points or less at the two minute mark of the 4th quarter. The NBA changed to its current
system at the beginning of the 2016-2017 season.
3MacMahon, Tim. “Referees association calls L2M reports ’flawed process,’ league office disagrees.” ESPN.com, 16 March
2018.
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and offender (age, gender, relationship, if any) and details on the incident (time and date, county where
the incident occurred, and injuries suffered in the incident). Following Card and Dahl (2011), we classify
family violence as at-home incidents of male-to-female simple assault, aggravated assault, or intimidation by
a spouse, partner, or boyfriend/girlfriend. We focus on male-on-female violence occurring at home between
6PM and 6AM, periods during or after NBA games. NIBRS contains a complete, detailed record of all
reported incidents of family violence and information on the timing and location of incidents that permits
matching them with NBA game day information.
NIBRS data may not reflect all incidents of family violence that occur, as this type of violence often goes
unreported to police agencies. Card and Dahl (2011) show that even with this limitation, a comparison of
reported incidents in NIBRS to other survey data on domestic violence, for example the National Violence
Against Women Survey, implies that NIBRS contains a high proportion of serious violent events experienced
by women age 18-54. Another limitation is that reporting by NIBRS partner agencies is voluntary and low.
However, reporting rates increased from 25% in 2006 to 29.3% as of 2016 (McCormack et al., 2017).
We collect NIBRS daily report data on family violence from 8 counties containing an NBA teams over
the period 2012-2018. Table 1 displays the county and team names along with average and median domestic
violence incidents for each county in the sample per 6pm to 6am time frame. Domestic violence incidents
vary substantially across these counties. This may reflect differing numbers of police agencies in each county.
Table 1: Family Violence Incidents by County
County Mean St. Dev. Median Max
Cuyahoga(Cavaliers) 4.95 2.72 5 15
Dallas (Mavericks) 0.40 0.65 0 4
Denver (Nuggets) 1.84 1.47 2 8
Harris (Rockets) 0.05 0.22 0 2
Maricopa (Suns) 0.24 0.48 0 3
Milwaukee (Bucks) 3.46 2.48 3 18
Oklahoma (Thunder) 0.02 0.15 0 2
Salt Lake (Utah) 2.23 1.89 2 11
This table summarizes reported daily incidents of family vi-
olence as defined in Card and Dahl (2011) (simple assault,
aggravated assault, and intimation) between 6PM and 6AM,
per county in our sample.
Table 2 contains information about NBA games that involve teams in counties with and without NIBRS
data. 3,893 NBA games in the sample were played by a team in a county with NIBRS domestic violence
data and 4,431 were played by teams with no connection to the NIBRS data. For example, the 3,893 games
include all games the Cleveland Cavaliers play, whether they are the home or away team. One issue that
could arise from a lack of complete crime data would be that domestic violence in counties with NBA teams
and NIBRS crime data could systematically differ from violence in counties with NBA teams and no NIBRS
data.
From Table 2, there does not appear to be substantial differences across NBA games with or without
matched NIBRS data. The final two columns in the table show the t-statistic for a difference in means test
assuming equal variance and the corresponding p-value for each t-statistic. The null hypothesis of equal
means cannot be rejected for many key variables, including the fraction of games that triggered an L2M
report. In cases when the null is rejected, the actual differences are not large and likely not economically
meaningful.
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The bottom panels of Table 2 contain information about L2M outcomes in NBA games with and without
NIBRS information. From the top panel, 16.4% of the games with matched NIBRS data resulted in the
publication of an L2M report and games without matched NIBRS data generated the exact same fraction of
L2M reports. From the t-tests for differences in means reported on the bottom panel, games in and not in
NIBRS are not statistically different in terms of the correctness variables, thus suggesting balance in sample
characteristics.
Table 2: Basic Summary Statistics for NBA Games
In NIBRS Not In NIBRS
N Mean St. Dev N Mean St. Dev t-stat p-value
Playoff 3,893 0.056 0.23 4,431 0.062 0.242 -1.159 0.2465
L2M 3,893 0.164 0.37 4,431 0.164 0.37 0 1
Nat’l TV 3,893 0.267 0.442 4,431 0.247 0.431 2.084 0.0372
Attendance 3,893 17.753 2.341 4,431 17.8 2.458 -0.893 0.372
4th Q Pace 3,893 95.269 8.168 4,431 94.333 8.057 5.25 <.01
Away Score 3,893 99.508 12.15 4,431 99.13 11.874 1.431 0.1524
Home Score 3,893 102.442 11.951 4,431 101.728 11.896 2.726 <.01
L2M Length 3,893 7.889 4.481 4,431 7.919 4.557 -0.302 0.7624
numberOfVeterans 3,893 2.698 0.468 4,431 2.687 0.476 1.061 0.2885
Ref Game Exp. 3,893 834.883 253.604 4,431 828.898 252.982 1.076 0.2822
Ref Season Exp. 3,893 14.097 3.612 4,431 14.025 3.606 0.908 0.3638
Game Length 3,889 136.062 11.741 4,429 135.391 12.131 2.561 0.0105
Tipoff Time 3,893 0.836 0.073 4,431 0.817 0.087 10.831 <.01
Days Off (mean) 3,893 2.959 1.521 4,431 3.022 1.42 -1.945 0.0518
Days Off (median) 3,893 2.688 1.498 4,431 2.722 1.345 -1.084 0.2786
Distance (mean) 3,893 0.884 0.359 4,431 0.91 0.427 -3.017 <.01
Distance (median) 3,893 0.838 0.441 4,431 0.845 0.506 -0.674 0.5001
Correct Calls 638 4.074 2.147 727 4.094 2.102 -0.173 0.8624
Correct Non-Calls 638 8.868 4.528 727 9.05 4.694 -0.728 0.4665
Incorrect Calls 638 0.135 0.368 727 0.127 0.349 0.41 0.6815
Incorrect Non-Calls 638 1.122 1.244 727 1.015 1.061 1.697 0.0899
# Correct 638 12.942 4.867 727 13.143 5.01 -0.751 0.4528
# of Total Calls 638 14.199 5.045 727 14.285 5.178 -0.31 0.7563
% Correct 638 0.909 0.092 727 0.917 0.083 -1.678 0.0937
100% Correct 638 0.331 0.471 727 0.348 0.477 -0.661 0.5085
2.3 Referee Fatigue
Refereeing professional sporting events constitutes a high pressure occupation. Demands on physical and
mental condition require that referees be conscious of effort expended during games and get adequate rest
between games worked. The NBA outlines specific conditions for referee work load throughout the season
through a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) with the National Basketball Referee Association, the
referees’ union. In terms of consecutive games worked, the CBA tries to limit the number consecutive
working days, and tries to limit the distance traveled by referees between games, so as to not cause stress
on referees4. Referee assignment complicates attempts to limit referee work load, as the NBA reveals referee
game assignments incrementally throughout the course of the season. According to the CBA, referees are
usually informed of their game assignments one month in advance, but later in the season, like in April
4Collective Bargaining Agreement between NBA Service Corp. and the National Basketball Referees Association, Article
III, Section 13. Effective August 2015.
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and May, referees only lear of their upcoming assignments three weeks in advance. The NBA makes referee
assignments public the day before games occur at 9AM Eastern Standard Time. The reasoning for limiting
information regarding referee assignment has to do with its possible effects on the gambling market, a problem
for the NBA in previous years.5
In our analysis of correctness and fatigue, we empirically test the hypothesis that referee accuracy de-
creases with the amount of rest between games. Research in the sports medicine literature found a negative
relationship between referee fatigue and technical performance in soccer matches. Evidence also indicates
that increased fatigue affects referee decision-making throughout games (Schenk et al., 2018), and this effect
reduces referee quality as the length of a match increases (Harper et al., 2014). In combination with our
data collected from the L2M, we use information on the location of games worked by specific referees to
generate referee fatigue measures that can be linked to L2M reports. A limitation to the L2M report is that
it does not record which specific referee is responsible for a correct or incorrect call. Due to this limitation,
our measurements of referee accuracy and fatigue will be aggregated to the crew-level, as almost all NBA
games have a crew of three referees.
We create measures of fatigue using location-specific variables that could generate fatigue. We match
distance traveled by each referee between consecutive games worked and the number of days off between
games. After collecting this information for each referee on a crew, we aggregate to crew-level for each game
and match the information to referee accuracy at the crew-level using the L2M report.
Referee accuracy measures collected from the L2M reports in Table 2 show that referees average approx-
imately 14 calls or material no-calls in the last two minutes of close games. The NBA evaluates 13 of the
14 calls as correct on average, which means that referees are accurate 91% of the time in close games. This
confirms statements made by NBA officials regarding referees accuracy in L2M games. Media reports quote
NBA commissioner Adam Silver remarking that referees get “roughly 90%” of calls correct in the last two
minutes of close games.6
We drop several games from our sample to address outliers in estimated fatigue. We first omit all games
played in the 2011 calendar year due to the NBA lockout during that period.7 We also drop 250 games
where at least one referee officiating the game had over 31 days of rest. These games mostly occur at the
beginning of each season, based on the assumption that referees rest in the off season. These games may also
include appearances by substitute referees and might be officiated differently than games involving regular
NBA referees. Finally, we drop 74 games that had 4 (72 games) or 2 (2 games) referees.
2.4 Sports Betting Market Data
An important feature of many sports is the existence of well-organized betting markets on outcomes in
these sports. Research frequently uses betting market outcome data to proxy for expected game outcomes,
since sports betting markets are known to be informationally efficient and accurate predictors of actual
game outcomes. We obtained betting market data for NBA games in our sample from the Sportsbook
Review website (https://www.sportsbookreview.com/, “On-line sports betting authority since 1999”), a
commonly used source of betting market data. We collected data on the final point spread and money
line odds for each NBA game in our sample. Point spreads reflect the expected difference in the number
of expected points scored by the home team and visiting team in each game, in the form expected visitor
5Eden, Scott, “How former ref Tim Donaghy conspired to fix NBA games.” ESPN.com, 19 February 2019.
6“Adam Silver on NBA officiating: ’Human error part of game.’” ESPN.com, 26 May 2016.
7The NBA began play on Dec. 25th 2011, so we drop 6 days of play in this season.
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points - expected home points. A point spread of -7 means the home team is expected to score 7 more points
than the visiting team. Money line odds reflect the payoff on bets on one of the participating teams to win
a game. We drop 9 games that missing either a money line or a spread from the sample.
Point spread betting does not focus on predicting the winner of a game. Instead, it focuses on the
difference in the number of points that will be scored by each team in a game. Point spreads provide
information about how much better one team is than the opponent. This permits identification of unexpected
home team loses based on the final point spread on each game compared to the actual difference in points
scored. For example, suppose the point spread on a game was -12 points. This point spread implies the
home team is expected to beat the visiting team by 12 or more points. If the home team actually loses the
game, it might be perceived as an unexpected loss. On the other hand a game with a point spread of +5
lost by the home team might not be perceived as unexpected, since the point spread implied that the home
team would lose the game.
2.4.1 Expected Outcomes from Betting Market Data
Like Card and Dahl (2011), we assume that the point spread on an NBA game is an unbiased predictor
of the difference in points scored by each team in that game. Figure 1 shows the distribution of point spreads
(horizontal axis) and difference in points scored (vertical axis) for all NBA games in the sample. Note that
actual differences in points scored have a much larger range relative to the point spread. Point spreads are
less variable than actual point differences since they are expectations, or the center of distributions. Despite
this, the average point spread in betting market data is usually not statistically different from the average
difference in points scored.
Also like Card and Dahl (2011), we use the distribution of the point spread variable in order to define
expected and unexpected wins and losses. We take the average of the point spreads in all games where
the home team is expected to lose, point spreads with a positive values (average = 4.9) and the average of
the point spreads in all games where the home team is expected to win, point spreads with negative values
(average = -6.9) and use these values to distinguish expected wins from expected losses. Figure 1 shows our
identification strategy, where the upper left corner of the plot contains all of the upset losses.
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Figure 1: Point Spread vs Final Score Difference
Games with a point spread greater (less) than the average point spread in the sample are considered
expected wins (losses) for the home team. So we define all games with a positive point spread greater than
4.9 as expected home team losses and all games with a negative point spread greater in absolute value than
6.9 as expected home team wins. This difference in cutoffs reflects home team advantage, a phenomena
previously identified and studied in the sports betting literature (Schwartz and Barsky (1977); Feddersen
et al. (2018)). Card and Dahl (2011) use a similar approach in their analysis of NFL games and point
spreads, but use +/- 3 points as their cut offs due to football’s low scoring nature and a common NFL field
goal being worth 3 points. While other studies in the literature, especially ones analyzing the NBA, use this
same cutoff, we argue this is too small. Three points in an NBA game is much easier to score compared to
three points in the NFL. Roughly, three points in an NBA game represents about 3% of the average score
while three points in the NFL represents about 13.5%.
2.5 Other Control Variables
Many reasons exist for why a referee makes an incorrect call at any point in an NBA game. An incorrect
call could simply be due to human error. However, other game factors like late tipoff times, high paces
of play, lengthier games, nationally televised games, or high game attendance could affect the accuracy of
referee decisions. Variables reflecting each of these factors were are collected through NBA.com’s API. We
include these game features as control variables in our empirical analyses.
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3 Empirical Strategy
We estimate the effect of referee accuracy on family violence using a novel identification strategy making
use of the NBA L2ms. As discussed previously, the NBA publishes post-game evaluations of referee perfor-
mance as a L2M containing details about whether or not referees made correct calls in the last two minutes
of close games. There are two main limitations to the L2M that prevent us from using referee correctness
directly as a predictor of family violence in regression models. First, the relatively low number of games
with L2Ms restrict the power of statistical tests. Second, since L2M only exist for close games, these games
are more likely to be predicted as close ex ante in betting markets. This significantly reduces the number of
upset losses with L2Ms to a small number
Due to these limitations of the L2M, we employ an alternative approach that uses information available
for all games that plausibly affects referee decision making. We focus on variables linked to referee fatigue,
like the number of days rest between games, changes in time zones between games worked, distance traveled,
game tip-off time, and the level of air pollution in the city where the game is played. The next section discuss
how we estimate the effect of fatigue on referee accuracy.
3.1 Fatigue and Referee Accuracy
Our identification of referee accuracy begins by assessing the relationship between referee fatigue and
correct calls in NBA games with L2Ms. We estimate regression models explaining referee accuracy in the
last two minutes of close game i, played at time t, using the following
Correctit = DaysOff it +Distanceit + TipoffTimeit +Xit + εit (1)
where Correctit is a measure of referee crew decisions evaluated as correct in an L2M. We use both the
number of correct calls and the precent of calls made judged to be correct as measures of referee accuracy.
We use several variables to proxy for referee fatigue in Equation (1), including the number of days rest
between games, DaysOff it and the distance traveled between games in miles, Distanceit. We also include the
game tipoff time, TipoffTimeit, as a potential proxy for referee fatigue, as referees might be more fatigued at
the end of games that start late in the day. Equation (1) also includes a vector of other covariates capturing
game conditions, Xit. This vector includes variables like game attendance, whether the game was nationally-
televised, the pace of play in the 4th Quarter, and the actual time length of the last two minutes of play.
We also specify a model to estimate the # of correct calls using the same specification as in Equation (1),
though we include a variable for the total number of calls made.
Equation 1 establishes the relationship between referee fatigue and referee mistakes in close games.
Results from estimating the parameters in Equation (1) are discussed below, after discussing the entire
empirical approach. As a preview, days off between games clearly explains observed referee accuracy in close
games. The next step in our empirical strategy identifies unexpected outcomes in NBA games.
3.2 Identifying Unexpected Outcomes
In order to analyze the impact of emotional cues on family violence, we need to quantify how expected
or unexpected an NBA game outcome was. Following Card and Dahl (2011), we estimate the probability of
a team winning a game, pit, using the observed pregame point spread, Sit and the actual game outcome yit.
In the notation used by Card and Dahl (2011), this function f(·) can be written as
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f(Sit, yit;λ) = λ1 · 1(Sit < −6.9) + λ2 · 1(Sit < −6.9)1(yit = 0)
+λ3 · 1(−6.5 ≤ Sit ≤ 4.9) + λ4 · 1(−6.9 ≤ Sit ≤ 4.9)1(yit = 0)
+λ5 · 1(Sit > 4.9) + λ6 · 1(Sit > 4.9)1(yit = 1)
(2)
where 1(·) is an indicator function that returns a value of 1 or 0 depending on the specified logical condition.
Again, the point spreads where we split the sample (-6.9 and 4.9) are the average point spreads for the
subsample of games where the home team is favored (negative point spreads) and for the subsample of
games where the visiting team is favored (positive point spreads). The parameters (λis) in this function
identify specific ranges in the point spread distribution on NBA games where actual game outcome can be
interpreted as unexpected. These parameters are defined as the averages of the positive and negative halves
of the overall point spread distribution. Recall that negative point spreads indicate expected home team
wins and positive point spreads indicate expected home team losses. In Equation 2, we are interested in
λ2, λ4, and λ6, as each proxies for emotional cues generated by upset losses, close losses, and upset wins,
respectively. Much of our empirical analysis focuses on the impact of upset losses.
3.3 Explaining Variation in Family Violence
The number of at-home, male-on-female family violence events, FVit, occurring between the hours of
6PM and 6AM on night t during the NBA regular season in county i home to an NBA teams represents the
main dependent variable in our empirical analysis. We explain observed variation in FVit with the following
empirical model
it = f(Sit, yit;λ) + φ(f(Sit, yit;λ), γit) +Xit + εit. (3)
We analyze variation in the number of incidents of family violence reported in county i in time period t
(it) as a function of Sit, the pre-game point spread, an indicator variable for the actual game outcome, yit,
equal to 1 if the home team won the game and zero if the home team lost the game, and λ parameters.
The function φ ties together how referee accuracy, as measured through fatigue (γit), and game outcomes
effect the number of family violence incidents. We also include Xit which are time-varying control variables.
εit represents a mean zero, possibly heteroscedastic random variable reflecting other unobservable factors
affecting observed incidents of family violence in counties with NBA teams.
In Equation 2, λ2, λ4, and λ6 capture the effects of unexpected NBA game outcomes on family violence.
We allow γit to enter into the model linearly. This way we can estimate a Poisson regression that relies on
interaction terms8:
µit = λ1 · 1(Sit < −6.9) + λ2 · 1(Sit < −6.9)1(yit = 0)
+λ3 · 1(−6.9 ≤ Sit ≤ 4.9) + λ4 · 1(−6.9 ≤ Sit ≤ 4.9)1(yit = 0)
+λ5 · 1(Sit > 4.9) + λ6 · 1(Sit > 4.9)1(yit = 1)
(λ2 + λ7) · 1(Sit < −6.9)1(yit = 0)γit +Xit + εit
(4)
In this specification, λ7 is the effect of one more unit of referee fatigue on family violence during an
upset loss. Using this identification strategy, we estimate the effect of unexpected game outcomes on family
violence given the level of referee accuracy, proxied through fatigue. The combination of measuring the effect
8This equation only interacts γit with upset losses, though our analysis explores this interaction with all game outcomes and
is robust to the different specifications.
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of referee fatigue on accuracy and how unexpected losses impact family violence structures referee accuracy
as a potential mechanism of family violence. The following section provides the results from this analysis.
4 Results
4.1 Referee Correctness and Fatigue
Table 3 contains results from estimating Equation (1) using a subsample containing only games with L2M
reports. This model explores the effect of referee fatigue on decisions in close games and establishes a link
between fatigue and referee decision making. Figure 10 in the Appendix illustrates the typical travel path
and time between games for a specific NBA referee over three seasons. Travel paths appear random season
to season, along with the amount of rest between games. The League assigns referees to games, so referees
cannot select themselves into specific games that might be easier to officiate. referees’ work schedules and
travel should be plausibly exogenous to unobservable factors affecting the quality of their decisions in games.
We use the percentage of correct calls and no-calls for referee crews per game and the total number of
correct calls as measures of referee crew accuracy in close games. We employ several alternative proxies for
fatigue based on distance traveled, days off between games, and game characteristics, using the NBA season
schedule to track referee work load. Table 3 shows only results for days off between games as a proxy for
fatigue. Equation (1) includes these other fatigue proxy variables including the length of the fourth quarter
in actual clock time, pace of the game in the fourth quarter, and game tip off time, as well as whether
the game was nationally televised and attendance. Parameter estimates for these other variables are not
reported on Table 3 since they are not statistically different from zero.
Our variables of interest are the number of days off between games and the distance traveled between
games, proxy variables for fatigue. Days Off simply reflects the average amount of time that elapsed between
games worked by referee crew members, which reflects time to recover from the physical and mental exertion
required to officiate an NBA game. The coefficient estimate for the number of days off is significantly
different from zero and indicates that the more recovery time members of a crew have between games, the
more accurate their calls in the last two minutes of close games.
Results in columns 1 and 2 in Table 3 use the mean days of reset for crew members as fatigue proxies
and columns 3 and 4 use the median. Again, we can identify fatigue proxy for each referee but cannot
always identify which call each referee made, because L2Ms do not always identify the referee who made
each evaluated call. Therefore, we need to use an average measure of fatigue for the referee crew. We choose
mean and median and the results are robust to this. We continue to use mean from here since it exhibits
slightly more variability across games, and thus more information than the median. Columns 1 and 3 use
the total number of correct calls and columns 2 and 4 the percent of correct calls as referee accuracy.
The results of all four regression models agree with one another. In all four, more rested referee crews
make better decisions in the last two minutes of close games, controlling for other factors that might affect
referee decision making. Again, very few of the games with L2M reports analyzed on Table 3 were unexpected
upsets, which we assume generate strong emotional cues triggering domestic violence. Since the results on
Table 3 establish a clear link between referee crew fatigue and accuracy, we include referee fatigue proxy
variables directly in the empirical models explaining variation in domestic violence to identify games where
referees might have made errors that led to unexpected losses.
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Table 3: Effect of Fatigue on Referee Correctness
Dependent variable:
# of CC % CC # of CC % CC
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Calls 0.893∗∗∗ 0.893∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.027)
Days Off (mean) 0.019∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.001)
Days Off (median) 0.020∗∗ 0.002∗∗
(0.009) (0.001)
Observations 1,365 1,365 1,365 1,365
R2 0.950 0.060 0.950 0.062
Adjusted R2 0.949 0.051 0.949 0.052
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
All models contain season × playoff fixed effects to control for differ-
ences in regular season and post-season correctness. All four models
exclude Shelby county and control for distance traveled by the referee
crew. We do not report the statistically not different coefficients on
distance traveled. Finally, all models control for game tip off time,
length of the last two minutes of play, pace of play in the fourth
quarter, attendance, and if the game was nationally televised though
all are not statistically different from zero.
4.2 Unexpected Losses and Family Violence
In Table 4, we adopt and extend the empirical work in Card and Dahl (2011) to examine the effect of
unexpected losses in NBA games on family violence. The results on Table 4 come from Equation (3). We
estimate the models for two different sub-samples of games: weekday games and weekend games. Since
nearly all NFL games occur on Sunday, we separate the sample into weekend and weekday games to make
our results more comparable to Card and Dahl (2011). The three most common days for NBA games are
Saturday, Sunday and Thursday.
These regressions use daily observations of family violence in a county where an NBA game was played
during the hours from 6 PM to 6 AM during the NBA regular season as the dependent variable, a measure
of interpersonal violence (IPV). We focus only on regular season NBA games, not the playoffs. Columns (1)
and (2) contain results for weekday games and columns (3) and (4) for weekend games.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Predicted Win −0.302∗ −0.192 0.046 −0.032
(0.171) (0.136) (0.241) (0.208)
Predicted Loss −0.171 −0.112 0.050 −0.098
(0.202) (0.130) (0.255) (0.204)
Predicted Close −0.217∗ −0.166∗ 0.109 −0.027
(0.129) (0.092) (0.247) (0.181)
Predicted Win : Loss 0.050 0.007 0.157∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.125) (0.067) (0.054)
Predicted Loss : Win −0.061 −0.106 0.022 0.022
(0.113) (0.108) (0.099) (0.095)
Predicted Close : Loss −0.027 −0.034 −0.050 −0.023
(0.054) (0.043) (0.053) (0.048)
N 6,568 6,568 2,584 2,584
Team FE Yes No Yes No
Month FE Yes No Yes No
Year FE Yes No Yes No
Team by Season FE No Yes No Yes
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
All regressions in this table use weekday and holiday fixed effects along
with controls for predicted win, loss and close like in Card and Dahl
(2011). We also include controls for tipoff time and whether a game
was televised nationally. We also cluster our standard errors at the
county/team level, remaining consistent with Card and Dahl (2011).
Our regressions reveal similar results for the NBA as previously found for the NFL: upset losses signif-
icantly increase domestic violence incidents, however only for NBA games played on weekends. The key
explanatory variables on Table 4 identify expected game outcomes based on the point spread on each game
(expected wins, losses, and games expected to be close), and interaction variables with actual game outcomes.
The key explanatory variable on Table 4 interacts the predicted win variable with an indicator variable for
actual losses. Following the existing literature, we posit that these outcomes generate strong emotional cues
that generate domestic violence.
From columns (3) and (4), the parameter estimates on the expected win-actual loss indicator variable
is positive and significant for weekend NBA games only. Domestic violence incidents increase on weekend
evenings in counties where the local NBA team experienced an unexpected loss, other things constant.
Column (3) reflects models including year, month, day of week and county fixed effects9. Column (4) reflects
9We limit our analysis to counties with only one NBA team, which means county fixed effects are the same as team fixed
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models including county by NBA season, month, and day of week fixed effects.
We control for NBA season rather than year because a team’s ability and/or expectations can vary
dramatically across different seasons, which could affect how fans process upset losses. Year fixed effects
would fail to capture this since each NBA season contains two calendar years. An example of a situation
like this occurred to fans of the Cleveland Cavaliers in 2013. During the 2013-2014 season, LeBron James
returned to the team, which tripled the number of nationally televised Cavaliers games from about 10 to
about 35. Figure 12 of the Appendix illustrates this increase in nationally televised games.
We next investigate referee accuracy as the mechanism for the results on Table 4. As discussed above, the
effects of referee accuracy in unexpected losses could trigger a violent outburst, as fans can identify blame
for the unexpected loss and project this onto their victims. To identify this mechanism, we combine our
results regarding referee fatigue with that of increased family violence after unexpected losses in Table 5.
Specifically, we estimate a similar regression, but allow the upset loss coefficient to vary systematically with
referee crew rest, measured by the average days off for the crew.
Table 5: Effect of Referee Fatigue in Unexpected Losses on At Home Intimate-Partner Violence
Dependent variable:
IPV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Predicted Win : Loss 0.708∗∗∗ 0.527∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.167)
Predicted Win : Loss : Days Off −0.199∗∗∗ −0.127∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.042)
Predicted Win : Loss : “High” Rest −0.104 0.104
(0.223) (0.249)
Predicted Win : Loss : “Medium” Rest −0.106 −0.053
(0.202) (0.150)
Predicted Win : Loss : “Low” Rest 0.473∗∗∗ 0.398∗∗∗
(0.105) (0.137)
N 2,560 2,560 2,560 2,560
Team FE Yes No Yes No
Month FE Yes No Yes No
Year FE Yes No Yes No
Team by Season FE No Yes No Yes
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
All regressions in this table use weekday and holiday fixed effects along with controls for
predicted win, loss and close like in Card and Dahl (2011). We also include controls for
tipoff time and whether a game was televised nationally. In addition, we include a full set of
interactions with fatigue & game prediction/outcome variables. We also cluster our standard
errors at the county/team level, remaining consistent with Card and Dahl (2011).
effects
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In Table 5, we interact various levels of rest between games with the variables identifying unexpected
NBA game outcomes. We interact the unexpected loss dummy variable and a continuous days off measure in
columns (1) and (2). The results show a significant and positive effect of upset losses on family violence, but
this is mitigated by the average number of days of rest for the referee crew officiating the game. Since rest is
positively correlated with correct referee decisions, we interpret this result reflecting referee decision making.
Because more rest between games increases referee accuracy, the emotional cue generated by unexpected
losses falls when the referee crew makes more correct calls, because the instigator of domestic violence
incidents cannot blame the upset loss on the referees. This, in turn, decreases family violence incidents
triggered by the unexpected loss. An extrapolation of these results would suggest that if referee crews rested
an average of 3.5 days the effect of an upset loss on family violence would be zero. This is found by dividing
the two coefficients in Column 2.
Columns (3) and (4) in Table 5 divide the referee fatigue measure into bins for high, medium and low
rest crew indicator variables. We choose this specification to reflect a non-linear relationship between fatigue
and family violence attributable to unexpected losses. Games are split up by dividing the rest variable
distribution into thirds at the 33rd and 67th percentiles of the distribution. We consider referee crews with
less than 2.33 days of rest as low rest, and consider crews with more than 3 days of rest as high rest games,
and crews with 2.33, 2.66 or 3 days of rest are considered medium rest.
Using this specification, we find the effect of unexpected losses on family violence occurs only in games
with low referee rest, or in other words high referee crew fatigue. Again, referees likely make more incorrect
calls in games with high referee fatigue, which can amplify the negative emotional cue generated by the upset
loss because of the presence of a scapegoat, incompetent referees, on which to blame the unexpected loss. In
the mind of a domestic abuser, the home team, with which the abuser identifies, performed admirably, but
the incompetent referees made the team lose a game they were expected to win.
The results of these regressions suggest heterogeneity in upset losses. Upset losses with fatigued referees
seem to generate more domestic violence relative to upset losses with rested referees. We hypothesize that
this is due to fatigue generating more errors, which fans are then able to blame on others. This assumes that
fan loyalty affects individual decision-making. Results in Lindo et al. (2012) supports this role of fan loyalty
by providing evidence that college achievement decreases, specifically for men, with the success of collegiate
sports programs.
5 Robustness Checks
Our main results suggest that when fans are able to place blame for an unexpected loss on referees, at-
home family violence increases. We posit that this expressive violence is triggered by increased referee errors
due to fatigue in unexpected losses. However, since we deviate from the literature by using larger cutoff
values to identify expected wins and losses from point spread data, we test the sensitivity of our estimates
to these cutoffs.
5.1 Varying Point Spreads
A major difference between this paper and Card and Dahl (2011) is the definition of predicted wins and
losses. This difference can be attributed to to several factors. First, there are inherent differences in scoring
in the two sports in question (NBA Basketball and NFL Football). Second, Card and Dahl (2011) use a
symmetric point spread of -3 for predicted wins and +3 for predicted losses, while we select the cutoff point
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spreads based on the averages of the positive (expected loss) and negative (expected win) point spreads. We
reestimate the models with varying point spread thresholds from -3 to -10 for predicted wins and +2 to +8
for predicted losses in order to check the sensitivity of the results to the selected point spread. We increment
the point spread threshold by .5 point increments, as shown in the point spread frequency distribution
in Figure 2. The long solid vertical line depicts the original threshold values, and the dashed lines show
what changing the threshold point spread for expected wins and losses looks like. When we change the
point spread threshold, we move both lines closer (farther) together (apart), which we consider a negative
(positive) adjustment.
Figure 2: Varied Point Spread
In Figure 3, we present the coefficient estimates on the unexpected loss indicator reflecting the impact on
domestic violence given zero referee rest in a game. A negative value on the x axis means a inward shift of the
point spread threshold identifying expected losses and wins, meaning the two cutoffs move closer together.
Positive values suggest larger upset losses. The left panel on Figure 3 reflects models including county and
season effects and the right panel reflects models including county by season fixed effects.
Larger upset losses, that is losses when the home team was a stronger and stronger favorite, generate much
larger increases in domestic violence. It is also the case that our point spread cutoff values, chosen based on
the observed distributions of positive and negative point spreads, appears to be an inflection point for this
effect. Figure 4 displays the estimates for our coefficient of interest, the indicator variable for unexpected
losses interacted with referee fatigue, and shows a similar pattern to Figure 3. Our results remain robust to
alternative point spread threshold values for expected wins and losses.
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Figure 3: Upset Loss Coefficient
Figure 4: Upset Loss : Days Off Coefficient
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5.2 Using L2M Correctness
We use referee fatigue to proxy for referee call correctness in the full sample of games. Including fatigue
proxy variables allows us to identify referee quality in ways that the L2M data fail to do. Using a fatigue
proxy and not actual call correctness provides two empirical benefits. First, the proportion of unexpected
losses in L2M games is not the same as the proportion of unexpected losses in all games. Using only games
with L2M reports generates a non-random subset of games which may not be representative. Second, fatigue
is likely to better capture referee performance over all 48 minutes of the game, and not only the last two
minutes. Further, referee fatigue, but not referee correctness, can be more easily targeted by NBA league
policy and other professional sports.
For completeness, we estimate the parameters of Equation (3) explaining variation in the number of
intimate partner violence incidents on a small subsample of NBA games with L2M reports played in the 8
counties in our sample. Table 6 contains the results. From Table 6, a negative relationship exists between
referee correctness in NBA games and intimate partner violence during evening hours after games were
played in counties where the games were played. Less domestic violence occurs in games where NBA referees
made more correct calls in the last two minutes of play, based on the L2M reports. This result supports the
results using referee fatigue as a proxy for referee decision making.




% Correct in L2M −0.156 −0.679∗
(0.136) (0.388)
N 694 694
Team FE Yes No
Month FE Yes No
Year FE Yes No
Team by Season FE No Yes
Weekday FE Yes Yes
Holiday FE Yes Yes
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
5.3 Days of The Week Sample
In our main analysis, we extend the results in Card and Dahl (2011) following their empirical approach
as closely as possible using data from NBA games by only using games played on weekends. However, we
can test the external validity of this identification by estimating models using other sets of weekdays. For
brevity, we only include results from regression models that use team by season fixed effects.
We test our specification on three different subsets of days of the week. First, we use all games in the
first two columns. Next, in columns 3 and 4, we use only games played on weekdays. Finally, we redefine
weekends to include Thursdays and Fridays as well as Saturday and Sunday. The key result persists across
these different specifications. While we do not find significance for upset losses alone in Table 4, we do find
evidence that upset losses affect intimate partner violence once we include fatigue.
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Table 7: Varying the Sample of Days
Dependent variable:
IPV
All Days Weekdays Extended Weekends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Predicted Win : Loss 0.359∗∗∗ 0.417∗∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗
(0.128) (0.144) (0.105)
Predicted Win : Loss : Days Off −0.102∗ −0.145∗∗ −0.086∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.069) (0.031)
Predicted Win : Loss : “High” Rest 0.027 −0.043 0.090
(0.081) (0.146) (0.079)
Predicted Win : Loss : “Medium” Rest −0.173 −0.196 −0.315
(0.168) (0.243) (0.285)
Predicted Win : Loss : “Low” Rest 0.242∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.060) (0.088)
N 9,031 9,031 6,471 6,471 5,112 5,112
Team by Season FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weekday FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Holiday FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
All regressions in this table use weekday and holiday fixed effects along with controls for predicted win, loss and
close like in Card and Dahl (2011). We also include controls for tipoff time, whether a game was televised nationally,
and team by season fixed effects. We also cluster our standard errors at the county/team level, remaining consistent
with Card and Dahl (2011).
6 Conclusion
Evidence shows that male-on-female family violence increases after unexpected losses by the local sports
team. These results offer compelling evidence that family violence increases in cities where home teams were
predicted to win according the Las Vegas point spread, but actually lose the game. Exploration of the NBA
L2M allows us to explore the role of referee decisions, in terms of referee fatigue, may affect the negative
emotional cue generated by unexpected losses, and in turn family violence. This objective evaluation of NBA
referee performance provides a basis for quantifying correctness in NBA officiating. We measure the effect
of rest on referee accuracy given variables like travel and days rest between games officiated. We find that
variables that measure rest between games in terms of time (e.g. extra days off, gaining hours by traversing
time zones) explains referee correctness.
We analyze National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS) data from counties that are home to 8
NBA teams, focusing on the effect of unexpected wins on reported at-home, male-to-female family violence
incidents. We find an increase in at-home, male-to-female family violence after unexpected losses.
We combine results from our analyses of referee fatigue and increased family violence after unexpected
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losses to identify mechanisms that may lead to increased outbursts of family violence. After analyzing
the interaction between referee accuracy and unexpected losses, we find that as referees are more fatigued,
family violence caused by unexpected losses increases. We interpret this result as, when the salience of a
loss becomes more clear, in that it is due not to performance of the local team but instead to good referee
decisions, the likelihood of emotional outbursts decreases. Our results persist in analysis of family violence
incidents given betting market expectations. Results indicate that our effect concentrates in games where
referees are fatigued and home teams were more heavily favored to win the game.
These results indicate that the link between unexpected losses and family violence is more pervasive
than previously thought, as we identify these effects in a sport other than the National Football League.
Identifying referee accuracy due to a lack of between-game rest speaks directly to ongoing debate in both the
NBA and college basketball. National Collegiate Athletic Association referees work more often and travel
further distances throughout a season than NBA referees. Coaches across the NCAA complain about the
heavy workloads of college basketball referees and the effect it has on the game.10 Discussion of shorter games
and shorter overall seasons continue between the NBA Player’s Union and the league’s board of governors,
as players and teams recognize the value of between-game rest.11 While leagues and team owners fear the
lost revenue the comes with shortening games or schedules, more rest for players and referees may be what
is best for the health and safety of the league and its fans.
10The Associated Press, “N.C.A.A. Referees’ Workloads Attract Comment and Scrutiny,” New York Times, March 2, 2013
11Reynolds, Tim, “Report: NBA, teams, players union discuss shortening season,” NBA.com, Nov 23, 2019
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7 Appendix
7.1 Betting Market Expectations and Unexpected Game Outcomes
The main results in the paper depend critically on identifying games with unexpected outcomes, which,
by assumption, generate larger emotional cues than games with expected outcomes. The results above use
the point spread on each game and the actual game outcome to identify games with unexpected outcomes,
using the approach of Card and Dahl (2011). However, other approaches can be used to identify games with
unexpected outcomes that make use of more data from NBA betting markets. This section develops and
alternative approach using both point spreads and money line odds for NBA games.
Consider a recent NBA basketball game between the Los Angeles Lakers and the Houston Rockets.12
The game is played in Los Angeles who is favored to win by 6. In gambling terminology, this is the point
spread. A bet on the Lakers wins if and only if they win by more than 6 points. A bet on the Rockets wins
if either the Rockets win, or the Lakers win by less than 6 points.13 The payoff consequences to these bets
is -110. This means that a gambler must risk $110 to receive a profit of $100. The extra $10, known as the
“vig” is the profit margin of the bookmaker.
In addition, a gambler can, instead, place what is known as a “money line” bet on the Lakers. This bet
wins if the Lakers win, regardless of the margin of victory. Similarly, a gambler can make a money line bet
on the Rockets. They must win for this gamble to be profitable. Since the betting market expects the Lakers
to win, a gambler must risk more to get the payoff. Similarly, a gambler who is willing to bet on the Rockets
to win when they are expected to lose, must receive a greater profit if the win happens. For this game, the
money line bet was Lakers -250 and Rockets +210. The former means that a gambler must put up $250 for
the chance to earn a $100 profit. The latter implies that if the gambler risks $100, then s/he can win $210.
These money line bets can be used to estimate the market’s expectations on the probability each team
will win the game. For example, consider a money line bet on the Los Angeles Lakers. One can ask what
is the probability the Lakers will win the game that would result in this being a “fair” bet. That is, if a
gambler is a risk-neutral, expected-wealth maximizer what is the probability of victory that would make the
gambler indifferent between betting on the Lakers and not?
A bet on the Lakers has an expected payoff of Eπ(Lakers) = 350Plakers + 0(1 − Plakers) where Plakers is
the probability the Lakers will win the game. If it happens the gambler making this money line bet will end
up with a wealth level of $350 − the $250 risked and the $100 profit earned. Alternatively, if the gambler





Alternatively, a bet on the Rockets to win generates an expected payoff of Eπ(Rockets) = 310Prockets +
0(1−Prockets) for a risk-neutral, expected-wealth maximizer. Not betting on the Rockets leaves the gambler





Notice that the two probabilities sum to a number greater than one. This, again, represents the profit
margin of the book maker. Thus, commonly in the literature, the midpoint is used
12This example comes from the actual betting odds of a game between the Los Angeles Lakers and Houston Rockets played
on February 6, 2020.
13A Lakers win by exactly 6 points is a push.
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P ′lakers =
Plakers + (1 − Prockets)
2
= 0.6959. (7)
In other words the gambling market expects the Lakers to win with a 70% probability.
Our insight is that the point spread and money line bets provide two points on the distribution that
captures the market’s expectations of what will happen in the game. Thinking of the expectations on the
home team’s margin of victory. The beliefs can be thought of as a distribution function with its mean at 6
(the point spread) and the probability mass to the right of the zero threshold of approximately 70% (i.e.,
1 − F (0) = 0.6959).
If we make the assumption that the betting market’s expectations follow a normal distribution, then with
these two measurements the standard deviation of the market’s expectations can be estimated. That is, we
can find σ where
F (0;µ = 6, σ) = 0.3061 (8)
and F (·) is the cumulative normal distribution. To complete this example, the estimated standard deviation
is 11.835. Hence, the expectations on the Lakers’s success in the game against the Rockets can be depicted
as follows
Instead, if another game (with a 6 point spread) is characterized by more certainty in the gambling
market on the outcome, so that σ = 6, cutting the standard deviation in half, then the probability the
favored team wins the game would be 0.8413. This would arise if the money line bet on the favored team
was -530 (instead of the Lakers’s -250).
Following this framework, we can not only identify the expected margin of victory (so that a surprise loss
can be recorded), but we can measure the certainty of those expectations. For example, if there is another
game with a point spread of 6, but with a larger standard deviation from the money line bet, this tells us
that this second game has more uncertainty in the gambling market than the Lakers-Rockets game, holding
constant the mean margin of victory. This will allow us to disentangle unexpected losses in games where
gamblers went into that game more uncertain of the outcome, from games with an unexpected loss where
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gamblers came in quite confident in the upcoming victory. This will allow us to test further whether the
ability to blame someone impacts the negative spill-over of the unexpected loss.
Using this idea of certainty, we can test how people respond to unexpected losses given certainty as well
as referee fatigue. To do this without getting into too many interactions, we simply partition the data into
games above or below the median level of certainty and above or below the median fatigue level. Next, we
estimate regression models like in Card and Dahl (2011). Table 8 explains the partitioning of the data. Since
average number of days off for the referee crew is nearly discrete, whether or not the median is included in
a certain group might effect the results of the test. In this table, games with the median amount of rest
are dropped in the first section of rows, games with the median amount of rest are included in the “Tired”
category in the second section, and games with the median amount of rest are included in the “Rested”
category in the third.
Table 8: Number of Observations for Each Category
Low Rest Med. Rest High Rest
Low SD 470 (24) 611 (28) 356 (17)
Med. SD 866 (23) 1171 (37) 739 (22)
High SD 422 (20) 669 (41) 410 (18)
Note: The number of unexpected losses are presented here in parentheses.
The estimates for unexpected losses can be seen in Table 9. The results of this indicate that regardless
of the certainty felt towards the game, as measured through the standard deviation, an effect for tired
referees persists. However, depending on how the sample is divided, the effect is bigger for games where the
market is more vs less certain though statistically indistinguishable from zero. Effects for violence appear
to concentrate in games where there is more uncertainty (higher standard deviation) in the game outcome.
A well-developed literature on the causes of family violence finds identifies risk-taking gambling behavior as
a characteristic among many violent offenders (Dowling et al., 2016). Our results suggest that games where
the outcome is more uncertain and referees are not rested, in-home family violence increases.
Table 9: Differences in Betting Confidence, SE CL at County level
Low Rest Med. Rest High Rest
Low SD 0.035 0.03 0.117*** 0.106** -0.018 -0.003
(0.067) (0.07) (0.036) (0.042) (0.055) (0.053)
Med. SD 0.088 0.119*** 0.037 0.036 -0.076* -0.066
(0.056) (0.028) (0.053) (0.067) (0.045) (0.042)
High SD 0.195** 0.157*** 0.009 -0.007 -0.089 -0.007
(0.079) (0.051) (0.04) (0.033) (0.095) (0.069)
Note: These coefficients are the result of a poisson regression that sorts games into categories. These
represent the effect upset losses and their respective standard deviation & rest combination have on Family
Violence. Standard errors are clustered by county.
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7.2 Empirical Winning Probability
Figure 5: Empirical Probability of Winning, given Point Spread
7.2.1 Time Series Family Violence Across Counties
Figure 6 contains time series plots of monthly incidents occurring in each county in the sample. Differences
in variation appear uniform and suggest a robust sample of incidents across the counties in our sample.




An argument that might arise is that the NBA could be strategically assigning referees to games in a way
that resulted in better referees officiating more games, and thus having less rest. However, if this is the case,
then the idea that referee ability being correlated with rest would only upward bias our negative result.14
Regardless, to ensure that we are indeed capturing referee fatigue and not a proxy for referee ability, we plot
the a few different variables against one another.
In Figure 7, we plot referee rest by the number of games they officiate. Here we find that as the number
of games increases, average rest decreases. This is intuitive since average rest should be the number of days
in the season divided by the number of games officiated. If there were 82 days in an 82 game season, on
average one game would be played every day making average rest to be 1 day. If there were 164 days and 82
games, average rest would be 2, and so on. There are two interesting caveats about this plot, though. First,
one can see a band of X’s extremely low on the plot relative to the other points. This is the 2011-12 season,
where the NBA had a lockout. Here, the NBA needed to squeeze in as many games as possible in just over
half the time of a regular season. Therefore, players and referees alike were unusually fatigued all season.
Second, the +’s seem to cutoff right around the 60 game mark. These depict referees in the 2017-18 season.
The NBA seems to have hired a handful of extra referees this year, thus decreasing the number of games for
each referee.
Figure 7: Avg. Rest by # of Games Officiated
This plot does not alleviate the potential of better, or more experienced, referees officiating more games.
Using experience as a proxy for ability, Figure 8 shows a shotgun distribution between the number of games
refereed and the experience of a referee, suggesting no relationship between the two. Lastly, Figure 9 plots
average rest against experience and again finds a smattering of points with no visible relationship after the
14maybe this is better placed later in the paper - robustness section?
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first few years of experience for referees. In the collective bargaining agreement, a referee is granted the
status of “veteran” after three years of more than 25 games. There appears to be a downward slope until
about 4 or 5 years, and then a mostly flat line. These plots suggest that referee experience and days of rest
are uncorrelated.
Figure 8: Referee Experience by # of Games Officiated
Figure 9: Referee Experience by Avg. Rest
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7.3.2 Referee Travel Maps





7.4 Distribution of SportsPlays.com Consensus Bets
Figure 11: Betting Volume by Game
7.5 Number of Nationally Televised Cavalier Games by NBA Season
Figure 12: Number of Nationally Televised Cleveland Cavalier Games by NBA Season
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